The literature on exchange rate regimes has recently observed that officially self-declared free floaters intervene strongly in foreign exchange markets to maintain their nominal exchange rates within some unannounced bands. In this paper, we provide an explanation of this behavior, labeled by Calvo and Reinhart as fear of floating. First, we analyze the linkages between the credibility of the exchange rate regime, the volatility of the exchange rate, and the band width of fluctuations. Second, we use the model to understand the reduction in volatility experienced by most ERM countries after their target zones widened in August 1993. Finally, we solve the model for a subgame perfect equilibrium, in which fear of floating can be viewed as the credible choice of a finite non-zero band.
Introduction
In the mid nineties, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) predicted a world of widely ‡o a t i n g exchange rates, given the removal of controls on international capital mobility. In contrast, recent analyses of exchange rate regimes have highlighted a common feature in exchange rate policies labeled as fear of ‡o a ting: de jure free ‡o a t e r s strongly intervene to soften the ‡u c t u a t i o n s of the nominal exchange rate (see Calvo and Reinhart (2002) , Reinhart (2000) , Fischer (2001) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) ). Intermediate regimes seem to be de…ning the current world so that completely …x e d or fully ‡e x ible rates are rarely observed. The general aim of this paper is to provide an explanation as of why countries have found it optimal to choose this intermediate alternative.
For this purpose, we introduce a highly simplifying but useful analytical starting point: any exchange regime is a particular case of a target zone. On one extreme, …x e d rates can be seen as target zones with band widths equal to zero. On the other extreme, pure ‡o a t i n g rates are equivalent to ‡u c t u a t i o n bands with a width tending to in…nity. In between, dirty ‡o a t s can be seen as implicit target zones with …n i t e bands while target zone regimes impose those bands explicitly. Viewed in this manner, the choice of an exchange rate regime amounts to a decision on the width of a band of ‡u c t u a t i o n .
In particular, this paper analyzes the linkages between the credibility of a regime, the volatility of the exchange rate and the width of the band where the exchange rate is allowed to ‡u c t u a t e . It has been argued that di¤erent exchange regimes, that is, di¤erent band widths, trade o¤ price stability with monetary independence. In this trade o¤, one of the most important ingredients are the beliefs that market participants have about the incentives of the central bank to defend the band, and these beliefs themselves a¤ect the behavior of the exchange rate. More rigid systems, that is, narrower bands, impose ex-ante limits to the ‡u c t u a t i o n of the exchange rate but also agents may perceive a higher risk of realignment in the future. These expectations should feed into the behavior of the exchange rate which itself determines the probability of a change in the system. Broader bands give more scope for the exchange rate to ‡u c t u a t e but markets may consider the likelihood of a realignment low. Thus, we analyze the incentives central banks have to renege from announced regimes and compute the endogenous relation between the width of the band, the volatility of the exchange rate and the probability of a change in the central parity of a target zone.
We use this analysis to understand two observations described in the empirical literature on exchange rates. First, consider the experience with the European Monetary System (EMS). This system was designed to foster stability of exchange rates among European currencies. In the language of Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) , by tying the hands of central banks, countries participating in the ERM could reach a certain degree of credibility for their monetary policies due to the discipline e¤ect. Thus when, on August 3rd 1993, the EMS widened the band of ‡u c t u a t i o n for the exchange rates, from 2:25% to 15%, some analysts predicted the demise of the EMS, given that the wider band could motivate higher volatility of exchange rates (the Spanish Peseta and the Portuguese Escudo moved from a 6% to a 15% band). The wider band appeared as a contradiction at the very moment when the Treaty of Maastricht was imposing severe convergence criteria to EMU candidates. It seemed that the door was left open to access an environment with more scope for monetary discretion, exchange rates instability and larger in ‡ation.
However, market participants and researchers have documented two related stylized facts after August 1993: a fall in exchange rate volatility (see Obstfeld (1996) ) and a substantial improvement in private beliefs about the long run sustainability of the EMS. Gómez-Puig and García-Montalvo (1997) estimate an EMS credibility indicator, based on the Markov switching methodology. For the post 1993 period, they …n d that credibility increased for most of the currencies. Ledesma et al. (2001) , using a wide variety of credibility tests for the EMS, also conclude that credibility increased after the widening of the bands.
As a second application, the model is also used to further explore the idea of implicit bands within o¢ cial bands estimated by Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) . These authors suggest that European central banks were able to optimally …n e tune their desired degree of monetary independence after the August 3rd 1993 reform. Their estimations of the implicit bands targeted by the monetary authorities are reproduced in Table 1 , in the column "Implicit bands". Some countries kept on holding a tighter band (Netherlands and Belgium), compatible with the former 2:25% system, but for most of the countries the narrow band system was no longer optimal. Hence, the 15% regime served as a benchmark reference under which all EMS countries were supposed to adjust the ranges of ‡u c t u a t i o n s for their currencies (see Table  1 ). Apart from the August 1993 ERM case, Table 2 Source: Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) and Deustche Bundesbank (1994-97) To capture this notion of implicit bands, we solve the model for a subgame perfect equilibrium where the central bank is given a menu of alternative band widths. Any of those bands produces an endogenous equilibrium credibility. Backward induction then reveals to market traders the lowest-cost regime, which in turn signals the optimal band to be credibly committed by the central bank.
The next section sets up a target zone model and the de…nition of a rational expectation equilibrium. A computation exercise is carried out in the third section. The results show that there is an endogenous relation between credibility and volatility as the band width increases. We use this result to interpret the experience of the EMS, namely, how volatility of exchange rates was reduced and credibility of the system increased as countries widened the bands of ‡u c t u a t i o n of their currencies. This section also includes the determination of the optimal band width to understand the choice of implicit bands of ‡u c t u a t i o n . The last section summarizes the most relevant results. 10:0% ! Float Uruguay January 4, 2002 3:00% ! 6:00% Source: Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) 2 The model
The model represents a highly stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy. It can be thought of as a reduced form version of more complicated fully optimizing models. Time is discrete. First, consider an equation specifying equilibrium in the money market:
where m t is money supply, p t is the domestic price level of y t , a tradable good, i t is the domestic interest rate of a one period of maturity bond, and t is some shock to money demand. They are all expressed in logs, with the exception of the interest rate. Parameters ' and are both positive: money demand increases with output because of a transaction motive and there is an implicit liquidity preference behavior, meaning that money can be a substitute for a bond that returns a nominal interest i t .
Let x t denote the log of the nominal exchange rate, expressing the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The (log) real exchange rate is given by
where p t is the foreign price (variables with a star will denote the foreign analogue). Call d t i t i , the interest rate di¤erential, where i is the foreign (constant) rate, and assume perfect capital mobility, risk aversion and the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP)
where E t is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t. The exogenous state variable r t represents the foreign risk premium, governed by a …r s t order Markov process
The expected rate of depreciation must compensate for the interest rate di¤erential plus the foreign premium. The white noise f" t g is supposed to be Gaussian, " t N (0; 2 ), for convenience. 1 1 The foreign risk premium plays a key role in the current paper. In general, UIP does not hold (see Ayuso and Restoy (1996) ). Conventional target zone models consider that deviations from UIP are negligible in target zones (see Svensson (1992) ). A common practice in some credibility tests of target zones relies in this idea (e.g. the simplest test, see Svensson (1991) , and the drift adjustment method of Bertola and Svensson (1993) ). However, Bekaert and Gray (1999) …n d that the risk premia in a target zone are sizable and should not be ignored. They argue that this might be the reason of why the credibility tests run on EMS at the beginning of the nineties failed in anticipating the 1992-93 turbulences. Alvarez, Atkenson and Kehoe (2003) show that time-varying risk premia is the primary force driving the link between interest rate di¤erentials and exchange rates. Because one of the objectives of the paper is to reproduce the distribution of these two variables, we concentrate on risk premia as the driving exogenous force in the model. Using (2), (3) and (1) one obtains
Total fundamentals f t amount to an endogenous process, m t , plus an exogenous process, v t . We will assume that both the central bank and traders can observe the realization of fv t g.
The monetary authority must choose the path for money fm t g so as to maximize its preferences subject to the evolution of fv t g. The objective is to set up these preferences to capture the degree of monetary independence that arises under alternative exchange rate regimes. As in Svensson (1994) , the concept of monetary independence is associated with the interest rate variability. At one extreme, and in the absence of realignments, a …x e d rate eliminates monetary independence. At the other extreme, a managed ‡o a t regime provides the highest degree of independence. In between, a target zone gives some scope to focus the monetary policy on domestic problems. To capture this idea, the central bank (henceforth, CB) preferences are modeled to evaluate the trade-o¤ between interest rate variability versus exchange rate variability
where 2 (0; 1) is a time discount rate. The objective function (6) assumes the fear of ‡o a t i n g behavior described in the Introduction. The intuition is as follows. We think of a very short maturity term for the bond in the UIP, say a few days, a week or a month at most. The idea is that the CB controls some monetary aggregate fm t g to target the pair fd t ; x t g. Output realizations and real ‡u c t u a t i o n s are observed with some delay, and not available by the time monetary policy is decided so the only available information at any period is f t ; r t g. From (3) and (5) it is easy to show that m t will respond one to one to the shock which restricts the policies available to the CB. The monetary authority will smooth ‡u c t u a t i o n s in the exchange rate by channeling part of the variation in the risk premium to interest rates. In this sense, the parameter in the function (6) will re ‡ect how much the central bank fears the ‡u c t u a t i o n s in the exchange rate.
In the function (6) the long run desirable target for the interest rate di¤er-ential is zero. The target for the exchange rate is the central parity c 0 around which deviations are punished by the relative penalty . Another possible speci…cation for the loss function could be instead to have the desired level of the exchange rate equal to the current central parity so that the contribution of the exchange rate to the loss function would be (x t c t )
2 . With this speci…cation a realignment would make a once-and-for-all contribution to the loss function while in our preferred speci…cation (6), deviations from c 0 will contribute to the loss function as long as they occur. Thus, our way of writing the objective function implies an extreme form of fear of ‡o a t i n g making realignments much more expensive in terms of central bank losses. In any case, although the choice of the objective function a¤ects computations quantitatively, none of the results described below depend qualitatively on this assumption. Still, this central bank may want to keep a target zone centered away from c 0 because it is its best response for a given behavior of the risk premium.
At any time t, the timing of events is as follows.
1. The system enters period t with the central parity c t 1 .
2. Then, the shock r t is realized.
3. It may be the case that the realization of the shock makes the exchange rate fall within the target zone [c t 1 w; c t 1 + w]. In this case, the central parity is left unaltered, so that this period's central parity is c t = c t 1 , forward looking agents form expectations E t (x t+1 ), for given expectations, the CB chooses fx t ; d t g by minimizing the loss (6) subject to the arbitrage condition (3), the relation in (4) and the additional restriction x t 2 [c t w; c t + w].
4. If for that value of the shock the exchange rate should be outside a band [c t 1 w; c t 1 + w], for instance, say it is above the upper limit c t 1 + w, the CB can do any of two actions:
It may defend the currency. This means that the central parity is not altered, c t = c t 1 and the exchange rate is pegged at the edge of the band, x t = c t + w.
It may realign the currency. In this case, the central bank devalues the central parity by , i.e. c t = c t 1 + , and situates the exchange rate at x t = c t 1 + maxfw; g, that is, the rate jumps to the new central parity if the realignment rate is higher or equal than the width, w. Otherwise, with overlapping zones, <w, the parity is altered by but the exchange rate remains at c t 1 + w. This condition is necessary in order to avoid jumps to the interior of the band, i.e. an appreciation of the exchange rate under a devaluation of the central parity.
5. Finally, for given shock t in the money demand equation (5), the CB supplies the optimal quantity of money m t supporting the chosen pair fx t ; d t g.
Because the risk premium r t is the only shock a¤ecting the interest rate di¤erential (d t ) and the exchange rate (x t ), we can express x t and d t as functions of r t . Thus, the target zone for the exchange rate de…nes a band for the risk premium. Let t 1 be the center of that band at the beginning of period t, before any realignment takes place. De…ne by t = jr t t 1 j the distance between the risk premium and the center of the band. Let be the width of the risk premium band. At the beginning of the period the system enters period t with the central parities c t 1 and t 1 for the exchange rate and the risk premium, respectively. Then, the realization of the shock, r t , takes place. Given c t 1 , t 1 and r t , the CB decides, simultaneously, this period central parities c t and t , as well as the values for the exchange rate and the interest rate. Abusing the notation, let x(c t 1 ; t 1 ; r t ) be the function linking the exchange rate to the centers c t 1 and t 1 and the realization of the risk premium at time t. All these numbers satisfy
x c t 1 ; t 1 ; t 1 = c t 1 w;
and x c t 1 ; t 1 ; t 1 + = c t 1 + w:
Thus, the possibility of an intervention is called for whenever r t exceeds the limits t 1 or t 1 + . Let be the probability, assigned by market participants, that the CB will defend the currency this period if the exchange rate falls outside its band. Reproducing the description of the events in the timing above, the function x c t 1 ; t 1 ; r t should satisfy
+ max fw; g if r t > t 1 + with prob. 1 +w if r t > t 1 + with prob.
with prob. max fw; g if r t < t 1 with prob. 1 : (10) In this expression u r t t 1 represents the function linking the exchange rate to the fundamental process r t within the band. This function is derived from the …r s t order condition of the minimization problem of the CB
To understand how the centers for the exchange rate and risk premium bands are computed assume that >w. Imagine that at some point in time t the shock exceeds one of its boundaries, say the upper one, so that r t = e r t 1 + . If the currency is defended, neither the central parity c t 1 nor the center t 1 are altered, so c t = c t 1 and t = t 1 . Then, the current exchange rate is set at x t = c t + w, and the interest rate di¤erential is given by 12) Instead, if the CB decides to devalue, the central parity and the exchange rate are moved to x t = c t = c t 1 + , and the new center for the risk premium is moved to t = e r. The interest rate di¤erential will be given by
For a given set of parameters f , , , wg and a probability of defense , solving the model amounts to …n d i n g the function x(c t 1 ; t 1 ; r t ) together with the limit . Outside of the band, condition (11) no longer holds and the trade-o¤ is not optimal. We use numerical methods to approximate the function u r t t 1 from conditions (11) and (10) . A technical appendix with all the details for the computation of the solution is included in Rodríguez and Rodríguez (2006) . Once the function u r t t 1 is computed, we use (10) and (3) to …n d the exchange rate and the interest rate di¤erential, respectively.
As an illustration, consider the following particular case depicted in …g -ure 1. Further details of the properties of the function x c t 1 ; t 1 ; r t can be found in Rodríguez and Rodríguez (2002). We consider a preference parameter = 0:5 and a standard deviation = 0:01. As in the EMS case, we select a width w = 2:25%, whose expected realignment rate is given by = 4:5% (these values are conveniently justi…ed in the following section). The exchange rate function is calculated for …ve values of the probability of defense, : 0, and 1. These functions are positively sloped for r t . The higher is , the ‡a t t e r the curve is, that is, the exchange rate response to r t gets smoother as credibility increases. Hence, a credible band helps stabilize the exchange rate within the zone. For values of close to 0, the slope of that function increases, implying that the exchange rate is more sensible to variations in the risk premium. Then, the volatility of the exchange rate increases as long as decreases.
Of course, the probability of defense is endogenous in this model and depends on the width of the band, w, and the preference parameter, .
The following section computes a rational expectations equilibrium where the endogeneity of is made explicit. We show that wider bands have two e¤ects on the volatility of the exchange rate. On the one hand, wider bands provide more room for the exchange rate to ‡u c t u a t e which increases its volatility. On the other hand, wider bands are more credible which raises the probability and lowers the volatility of the exchange rate. 
A rational expectations equilibrium
The rational expectations equilibrium of this model amounts to …n d i n g a …x e d point for the probability of defense, . The idea is as follows. For a given set of parameters ( , , , and w), and a prior about the probability , market participants may compute the ex-post incentives the central bank has this period to renege from the target zone regime. To estimate those incentives agents calculate the losses for the central bank derived from defending the zone as compared to its losses from realigning the band for any possible realization of the shock. Then, they compute the probability of the realizations for which losses from defending are smaller than those of realigning. The rational expectations equilibrium imposes that this probability should be equal to . If it is not equal, market participants deduce that they were not estimating consistently the probability of defending and update their estimations consequently. To understand how this equilibrium is computed assume, for concreteness, that >w. As before, imagine that at some point in time t the shock exceeds one of its boundaries, say the upper one, so r t = e r t 1 + . If the CB defends the band, the exchange rate is set at x t = c t + w, with c t = c t 1 , while the interest rate di¤erential is given by (12) . Hence, the losses of the CB are equal to
where E D t is the conditional expectation operator, given that the CB defends at time t. Instead, if the CB decides to devalue, the central parity and the exchange rate are moved to x t = c t = c t 1 + , and the interest rate di¤erential is given by (13) . Then, the CB receives a loss of
where E R t is the conditional expectation operator, given that the CB realigns at time t. Now de…ne the function G( t ) as the di¤erence
with t de…ned above. If, for some > , G ( ) is negative, the costs from realigning will overcome that from defending and the CB will keep the exchange rate at its primitive margins. Otherwise, when G ( ) > 0, realigning will be preferred to defending for that particular value of the shock. Indi¤er-ence stands for the case G( ) = 0. Since the objective function is quadratic, the function G ( ) is an increasing function of the absolute value = jr j, that is, the costs from defending relative to the costs from realigning increase as the value of the shock deviates from the center of its band. Notice the relative costs of defending are only conditional on the value of the shock relative to the current center of its band; they do not depend on previous costs. So, once the value of the shock r has been reached, the function G ( ) determines whether it is preferable to defend or to realign. That is why we do not write the subindex t anymore. Given the behavior of the function G ( ), there must be a value for the distance of the risk premium to the center of its band, call it , such that for all > it is preferable to realign, that is, G ( ) > 0. Then, market participants can determine the probability of reaching such a value which will be related to the probability of defending. With this information, they can evaluate whether the assumed , the subjective probability of defense, was correct or not.
Furthermore denote by t ( ) the probability that a random walk stream, fr g 1 =t , always wanders inside a moving corridor of width 2 0, centered at f g
and analogously de…ne t as
such that >0, and where the process f t g 1 =t+1 is updated as follows
Notice that the function t ( ) is monotonically increasing. This implies that
Intuitively, agents observe that there exists a shock making the CB indi¤erent between defending and realigning. Equilibrium is found when the proportion of times that this shock is perceived to occur equals the proportion of times the currency is observed to be defended that is, a number . A more formal equilibrium concept follows: De…nition 1 : (Rational expectations equilibrium) A target zone system de…ned by the parameters ( , , , , w) and the probability is said to be a rational expectation equilibrium, if there exists a distance between the risk premium and the center of its band , such that
and
where is the implied band width of the risk premium zone and the functions G( ) and ( ) are de…ned in the text.
Condition (18) makes agents perceive that the CB is indi¤erent between realigning or defending. Condition (19) implies that market traders perceive the CB is defending with a probability whenever a marginal intervention is called for. On the one hand, the central bank will not realign as long as the distance is not larger than which happens with probability ( ). On the other hand, the market anticipates that realignment does not occur if the risk premium stays with its band, which happens with probability ( ), or if the shock leaves its band and the central bank defends the target zone which happens with probability 1 ( ) . Obviously, in equilibrium these two probabilities of defending should be equal, that is,
and solving for gives condition (19) . Imagine that condition (19) is matched, but condition (18) is not. For instance, imagine there is a value for r, say e r, such that G( e ) = G(je r j) < 0 and [ ( e ) ( )]=[1 ( )] = . Market participants perceive that the central bank would be strictly better o¤ from defending and letting the risk premium to deviate further from its center. Hence, there is still room for the risk premium to be higher, say r + > e e r, before the central bank generates a devaluation. Since the function ( ) is monotonically increasing, this means that
That is, the perception by the market of the proportion of times the currency will be observed to be defended, out of the margins of the zone, should be higher than . Agents will revise their estimation of the probability of defense by increasing their subjective probability of defense, say to e > . With a larger value of , the function u(r t t 1 ) becomes ‡a t t e r and the limit of the band for the risk premium, , larger. Given that ( e + ) < 1, this movement of reduces the left-hand side of (20) . Notice, the response of the market increasing moves the economy towards the equilibrium by closing the gap in (20) .
Results
This section is organized in four parts. The …r s t one calibrates the model. The second part computes the rational expectation equilibrium for the calibrated parameter values. In particular, we calculate the endogenous credibility of the target zone, as represented by the probability of defense . Estimations of conditional volatilities are given in the third subsection. The …n a l subsection addresses the determination of the optimal band.
Parameter values
Since the model does not permit a closed form solution we perform numerical simulations. This requires us to assign numerical values to each of the models parameters. 2 We take the experience of the ERM as our benchmark case for the calibration. Thus, three bands are chosen, w = 2:25%, 6:00% and 15%, the o¢ cial widths experienced in the ERM. The value of the constant realignment rate is estimated depending on the band width, w. By estimating di¤erent realignment rates for the di¤erent band widths, we simply want to extract some …g u r e s that reasonably describe the ERM history. Thus we conclude that = 4:5% and = 6:3%, for widths w = 2:25 and w = 6%, respectively, are consistent with the EMS history. For the wide band 15% we use = 7:5%, as the Spanish Peseta was so devalued in March 6th 1995.
A VA R estimation leads to conclude that = 0:01 can be a reasonable value for the standard deviation of the risk premium shock. This value parallels some other estimations for the risk premium standard deviation found in the literature. Regarding the preference parameter , we have used a grid ranging from 10 8 to 1. Finally, we think of a month as the time frequency. As in Svensson (1994) , the time discount factor is set to = 0:90
. We use this value to ease the calculations but the main results of the paper do not hinge on it.
Credibility
The implementation of the rational expectation equilibrium goes as follows. We start by assuming c 0 = 0 = 0. For particular values of , , , and w, we guess the equilibrium probability of defense , and solve the model, that is, we …n d the function u, and the bounds for the risk premium band, . Second, we compute the value of from expression (19) . Third, we simulate N = 1000 runs of T = 500 observations for the shock starting at the value r = . Fourth, the relative costs of defending versus realigning are computed for each run in the simulation so the cost G ( ) is approximated as the arithmetic mean over the N = 1000 simulated runs. If the estimated G ( ) is positive (negative), we scale down (up) the initial value of and repeat the process until convergence is reached (see appendix C in Rodríguez and Rodríguez (2006) for the details of this iterative process). Table 3 collects the equilibrium values of for di¤erent combinations of the preference parameter , and the three widths considered. In our search of values, we …n d that should be smaller or equal than 0:1 in order to produce equilibrium values of strictly within the (0; 1) interval. In complementary exercises (not reported here), when has been increased, this range for has increased: when the risk premium su¤ers a bigger volatility, a central bank needs a higher in order to preserve a certain degree of credibility. The main result to be highlighted from Table 3 is that the equilibrium probability of defense increases as the band widens. The market perceives that this situation might discourage the monetary authority to renege from the target zone arrangement. Thus, credibility increases with the band width. Another interesting result is that the system is more credible the larger the preference weight attached to the variability of the exchange rate, . If the central bank exhibits a strong preference for targeting of the exchange rate around the central parity, the exchange rate variability will be lower. The preference parameter punishes any deviation from the central parity. Then, the central bank …n d s it consistent to commit to the target zone arrangement with a higher probability.
Although the quantitative outcomes of this exercise are highly sensitive to the realignment rate , the qualitative results remain the same independently of the particular value of or any other parameter. Here, we are assuming that as the band gets wider, the realignment rate increases too which increases the cost of changing the central parity and makes the system more credible. The choice of making dependent of the width of the band has been made to match what we observe in the data. However, if were constant the same e¤ects would appear. The lower panel of Table 3 presents the equilibrium value of for di¤erent band widths when the realignment rate has been …x e d at = 7:5%. We observe the probability of defense still increases with w. This is due to the fact that as the band widens, the probability of incurring in the …x e d costs of realigning decrease.
Vo l a t i l i ty
We also compute the standard deviation of the exchange rate, for t = 1; 2:::36 periods ahead, conditional on information available at time 0
If we consider that the starting value for the risk premium is r 0 = 0, it is easy to show that the conditional expectation of the exchange rate is E 0 (x t ) = c 0 = 0. The standard deviation for the interest rate di¤erential has a similar form:
Again, for r 0 = 0, it is easy to show that the conditional expectation of the interest rate di¤erential is E 0 (d t ) = 0 = 0. Figure 2 shows the conditional standard deviation in (21) for the di¤erent time horizons and the three band widths used in the EMS. The value used for is 0.0001. We observe that the volatility of the exchange rate 19 periods ahead in the system with the width of 15% is smaller than the one with the zone of 2:25%. The reason for this result is in Table 3 where we …n d that the probability that the central bank will defend the band in the …r s t system is 85 percent while with the narrow band is only 23 percent. We also observe that these reductions in volatility from moving to the wide band increase as the time horizon is larger. With a larger probability of realignment future discrete jumps in the exchange rate are more likely. Figure 3 presents the same computations with = 0:1. With this value for the central bank preferences wider bands present higher volatility. In this case, it is in the interest of the central bank to foster credibility and market participants know that the monetary authority will be likely to defend the band often. In fact, Table 3 shows that all bands are equally credible. The only di¤erence stems from the di¤erent reaction of the exchange rate to movements in the shock. This response is given by the slope of the function u which is smaller for narrower bands.
Finally, Figure 4 presents the volatility of the interest rate di¤erential for = 0:0001. We observe this volatility decreases with the widening of the band. A broader band allows for more monetary independence, that is, the central bank enjoys more degrees of freedom to adjust the nominal interest rate to domestic conditions. With a wider zone the exchange rate may now absorb more variability from the risk premium shock. At the same time, a wider band is also more credible, which helps stabilizing forward looking expectations and, through the UIP, the interest rate di¤erential. Summarizing, the model is consistent with the observed experience in the EMS as reported by Ayuso et al. (1996) , Gómez-Puig and García-Montalvo (1997), Ledesma et al. (2001) and Obstfeld (1996) . As pointed out in the Introduction, after the widening of the bands in 1993, these researchers found a reduction of the volatility of the exchange rate together with an increase in the credibility of the system. Our computations show that this could happen for large enough values of the preference parameter . 
The optimal band width
This subsection explores the idea of Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) about non-o¢ cial bands inside o¢ cial bands. Their estimates suggest that, while the widths of the target zones were widened on August 1993, most of EMS countries found it optimal to target a tighter band than 15% (see Table  1 ): The Netherlands kept on pursuing a close targeting to the DM, while Belgium enforced a band similar to that of the previous period. The rest of countries preferred to gain more degrees of freedom for their monetary policies, probably due to the need of meeting the convergence criteria imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.
The exercise of this subsection rationalizes the choice of this nono¢ cial bands by solving the model for a subgame perfect equilibrium. Given a value for the parameters , , and , an equilibrium probability can be found for any band width w 0. This de…nes a continuum of equilibria within which one can compute the ex-ante costs from such strategy as measured by (6) . Any of those widths conforms the strategy set of the CB. A credible Nash equilibrium is determined by choosing the strategy that returns the minimum ex-ante cost. This is the optimal band width.
In order to perform this exercise, a word has to be said about the rate of realignment. At the beginning of this section, we suggested a positive correlation between the band width and the realignment rate, on the basis of EMS history. We mapped the value of = 4:5% to w = 2:25%, and = 6:3% to w = 6%. In order to keep the same schedule in the parameters, we make the realignment rate vary linearly with the band matching these previous points. This takes us to the function = 0:0342 + 0:48w:
Denote J(w) the costs derived from the rational expectation equilibrium associated with the width w, given the rest of parameters. The optimal band width is found as w arg min
Let denote the equilibrium probability of defense associated with the optimal band w . These steps have been repeated for thirteen di¤erent values of for a grid ranging from 0:0008 to 0:05. Table 4 includes the equilibrium values for the optimal band and the associated probabilities of defense for several values of . We observe that, as the central bank dislikes more the volatility of the exchange rate (that is, as increases), the optimal band becomes smaller and, at the same time, more credible. The reason is as follows. Having a CB which dislikes more exchange rate ‡u c t u a t i o n s make market participants understand, given the rest of parameters, that realignments will be less frequent and, thus, the credibility of the system increases. As the credibility of the target zone gets larger, the function u(r t t 1 ) linking the risk premium to the exchange rate, ‡a t t e n s and the volatility of the exchange rate is reduced. The CB can take advantage of this volatility reduction in exchange rates and channel part of it to the interest rate. This is done by reducing the band width, the policy parameter the CB can manipulate (given the realignment is linked to the band width, w).
In this sense, the August 3rd 1993 reform can be viewed as a benchmark regime within which all the EMS countries could optimally adjust their targeted zones where the exchange rates were allowed to ‡u c t u a t e . An important corollary of this result is that, while this optimal …n e -t u n i n g of bands can be achieved when the o¢ cial band is 15%, the o¢ cial narrow width period of 2:25% could only make feel uncomfortable those EMS currencies who wished to use a bigger optimal degree of monetary independence. The column of Table 1 labelled "Maastricht" collects the average number of criteria not satis…ed by the countries in the sample of Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) from 1993 until 1996. With the exception of Ireland we see that countries that decided to let the exchange rate to ‡u c t u a t e in wider bands were the ones that did not satisfy a larger number of criteria and therefore needed to make more adjustments in their domestic economies. 
Conclusions
The choice of an exchange regime can be viewed as the choice of a band width of a target zone. This apparently strong assertion has been the guiding line of the current paper. In fact, we observe that target zones are the most common exchange agreements in recent history. The most important currencies in the world are traded under regimes with bands of ‡u c t u a t i o n , o¢ cially or uno¢ cially. The importance of the band width is twofold: …r s t , it determines the degree of monetary independence, that is, the degree of ‡e x i b i l i t y the central bank has in order to adapt monetary policy to home conditions and second, it determines the credibility of the exchange regime. These two items are closely related. This paper presents a model where the endogenous relation between the width of the band, the credibility of the target zone and the volatility of the exchange rate is made explicit. Our simulations show that there is a negative relation between the width of the band and the market's rational assessment of the probability of defense of the zone. Thus, there are two opposite forces when moving to a wider band. First, we get closer to the free ‡o a t which increases volatility but, second, the credibility of the band increases and this, in turn, reduces volatility. A calibration exercise has shown that for some parameter values, the credibility e¤ect may dominate so that widening the bands decreases exchange rate ‡u c t u a t i o n s . This result o¤ers an explanation of why wide bands could be more credible and less volatile than narrow bands, as reported by the empirical literature on the EMS.
Our …n d i n g s also imply that central banks may target wider bands out of concern for exchange rate volatility as they try to gain credibility. However, the possible reduction in volatility associated with wider bands does not necessarily lead to one of the extreme regimes, that is, the free ‡o a t i n g . We have found that, depending on the market's perception of the relative weight the CB gives to exchange rate versus interest rate stabilization, there exists an optimal band width. Thus, our model has also a normative implication that serves as a valid rationale for the estimates of implicit bands, found by Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) . O¢ cially, countries can declare themselves as ‡o a t e r s within a broad band, but market participants may appreciate a fear of ‡o a t i n g that leads the central bank to target an uno¢ cial implicit band.
